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1. Introduction  
 
During the last few decades many developed and emerging countries introduced and/or 
revised their Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS) to make safety nets more effective, forestall bank runs 
and reduce public costs associated with bank failures (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). In the European 
Union (EU), a weakness of the original regulatory framework was the lack of a homogeneous 
approach that was leaving room to potential distortions, which could undermine national DIS 
effectiveness to curb bank risk, particularly in the long-run. Recent regulatory adjustments have 
resulted in a sizeable increase in the maximum amount of coverage per depositor from €20,000 to 
€100,000 in 2009. However, deposit insurance provisions include a relatively wide range of features 
in addition to coverage, that can have an incremental effect on moral hazard incentives. These include 
co-insurance and powers to intervene a bank, as well as the way the funding and administration of 
DIS are organised. In relation to this latter, in 2014 several modifications of national DIS have also 
been introduced.1 Despite the steps towards a more harmonized deposit insurance provision in 
Europe, a common system for deposit protection that would complete the Banking Union has not yet 
been established. 
The DIS features are generally expected to enhance depositors’ confidence and minimize 
banks’ moral hazard conduct; however too generous or lax schemes may also promote bank risk-
taking and make financial systems vulnerable to crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagiache, 2002; 
Barth et al., 2013; International Association of Deposit Insurers - IADI, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). The 
topic is well researched but theoretical and empirical findings are mixed and in some cases even 
                                                          
1 For fifteen years the design of DIS was left to national discretion and there was only a minimum harmonisation. The 
European deposit protection schemes were regulated by Directive 1994/19/EC that remained substantially unchanged 
until the outburst of the global financial crisis. The EU enacted two Directives in 2009 and 2014 to amend the existing 
European DIS.  
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contradictory, thus it remains open to more investigation. In addition, there are only a handful of 
studies focusing on the EU case. Gropp and Vesala (2004), for example, use data from the 1990s and 
find that the presence of deposit insurance increases banking sector stability. Anginer et al. (2014) 
find that publicly traded banks operating in 96 countries are more stable in presence of more 
protective DIS, especially during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. In contrast, other studies show that 
the relationship with stability is not always straightforward. Barth et al. (2004) find a positive 
association between banking crises and levels of deposit insurance while Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), Laeven (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999, 2004) and Forssbaeck 
(2011) find that deposit insurance represents an incentive for bank risk-taking. Similarly, Lambert et 
al. (2017) offer evidence of the unintended effects of the increase in deposit insurance in the US in 
2008, as banks that significantly increased the amount of insured deposits after the enactment of the 
new rules became overall riskier. 
This paper provides several contributions to the extant literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first to focus on the European case in the 2000s, based on a sample of banks 
headquartered in the 27 EU member states2 over a relatively long period that includes the financial 
crises. Most existing empirical studies either concentrate on the US case or, if they extend the analysis 
to other countries, including Europe, they examine only selected features of the deposit insurance 
arrangements. Our study relies on a very detailed set of DIS features calibrated according to the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision (BRS) Surveys carried out by the World Bank (2003, 2007 and 2012) 
and the European Commission reports (2004, 2010 and 2011). In particular, it includes: i) the degree 
of deposit coverage provided by national DIS; ii) the funding of national DIS and their administration; 
and finally, iii) the power of intervention of DIS on banks and their management.  
                                                          
2 We consider the EU composition at the beginning of 2013 (the last year of our analysis). As Croatia joined the EU on 1 
July 2013, we limit the data sample to twenty seven member states (EU27). 
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Second, this study not only assesses the relationship between deposit insurance coverage over 
GDP per capita and bank stability and possible non-linearities, but also focuses on the relationship 
between DIS features and stability in the global financial and sovereign debt crises compared to the 
pre-crisis period. As far as we know, this has not been done before for EU countries. We hypothesize 
that the relationship between DIS features and moral hazard incentives may differ in normal vs 
turbulent times, and that too generous schemes, particularly excessively high insurance coverage, can 
induce greater risk-taking behaviour and make financial systems more fragile.  
Third, our study examines whether the effect of a selection of DIS features on bank stability 
varies by banks’ business model, size, and degree of dependency on deposit funding. It also 
investigates the effects of DIS under different ‘operating environments’  (IADI, 2014) taking into 
account the health of the EU economies (i.e. countries less affected by the financial and sovereign 
crises), the orientation of the financial systems (bank- vs market-oriented), and the power of the 
supervisory authority. In terms of policy implications, our analysis allows to retrospectively assess 
the goodness of regulatory novelties introduced by the 2014/49/EC Directive (i.e. mandatory ex-ante 
premia and risk-adjusted premia) and contributes to the debate related to the efficacy of the design of 
DIS in safeguarding the stability of the banking sector (Financial Stability Board - FSB, 2012; IADI, 
2014). It also lends itself well to useful considerations in light of 1) the  need, formulated in the EU 
Directive 2014/49, to assess the adequacy of the European DIS and its impact on the different business 
models; and 2) the build-up of the third pillar of the European Banking Union that is still missing, the 
EDIS (European Deposit insurance Scheme).  
Our main findings are broadly consistent with those of Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010), Anginer et 
al. (2014) and Liu et al. (2016) and extend them to include evidence of non-linearities between 
coverage and stability for a detailed and large EU sample using recent data. Specifically, our results 
reveal an inverse U-shape pattern where bank risk increases at high levels of coverage. The identified 
quadratic relationship allows us to calculate the turning point and estimate that during the crisis the 
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level of coverage at which bank stability start diminishing is 3.6 times the GDP per capita. We find 
evidence that DIS without co-insurance are more stable both in tranquil and financially turbulent 
times. In addition, the introduction of temporary measures, like blanket guarantees, appear crucial to 
avoid panic among depositors. During the crisis some features that generate moral hazard incentives 
can decrease bank stability, such as for countries characterized by the absence of risk-adjusted premia. 
It also indicates that often it is not the single feature but the interaction among different ones to affect 
significantly bank stability. Finally, we show that the composite design of a DIS exerts a different 
impact on bank stability depending on the bank types and business models  as well as on the 
characteristics of the operating environment.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature. 
Section 3 describes the data sample and the methods used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 
discusses the main results. Section 5 presents various robustness tests. Section 6 concludes and 
discusses policy implications. 
 
2. Selected literature and research hypotheses 
Over the past forty years, seminal theoretical studies have been carried out that highlight the 
benefits of deposit insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Kane, 1995). Nonetheless, this provision 
can also provide banks incentives to increase risk exposure in search for higher profits, as long as the 
deposit insurer will cover a large part of banks’ debts in case of default (Merton, 1978; Acharya, 
2009). Typically, DIS have been associated with the presence of a coverage and its optimal level 
(Dreyfus et al., 1994; Cordella and Yeyati, 2002), but recent years have seen increasing evidence that 
other DIS features are equally important in triggering risk incentives and sometimes it is their joint 
effect to matter the most. This suggests that to mitigate moral hazard a DIS should include appropriate 
design features. Examples include: differential or risk-adjusted premium systems, limits on the 
amounts insured, exclusion of certain categories of depositors from coverage, and mechanisms for 
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the minimization of the risk of loss through timely intervention and resolution of troubled and failed 
institutions by the deposit insurer or other participants in the financial safety net (Pennacchi, 1987, 
2006; Grossman, 1992). Other important characteristics of DIS are the nature of the deposit insurer 
(public vs private) and the source of funding (Calomiris, 1990; Kane, 1991; Morrison and White, 
2011; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). This implies that to be effective, DIS should be designed taking 
into account the extent to which the interaction of different features pertaining the amount of the 
deposit insurance, the funding, the administration and power of intervention of the deposit insurer 
can magnify bank moral hazard.  
In light of the above, we formulate the following research hypotheses:  
 
H1. The generosity of the deposit insurance coverage decreases bank stability.  
H2. Banks become more unstable when the funding and administration arrangements of 
national deposit insurance schemes generate moral hazard incentives. 
H3. Bank stability is lower when deposit insurers do not exercise disciplinary power on 
banks. 
 
The first hypothesis H1 suggests that a generous DIS may lead to higher moral hazard 
(Dermiguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000) that ultimately decreases bank stability.3 We also conjecture that 
funding and administration practices and the presence of power of intervention can impact bank 
stability. We expect these relationships to be more pronounced in periods of crisis, especially relative 
to H2 and H3. 
                                                          
3 We associate high generosity of DIS with a situation that could promote risk-taking. For example, in Garcia (1999) 
excessively high coverage contributed to the US Savings & Loans banking crisis in the 1980s. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2000) do not clarify generosity in quantitative terms but use “excessive coverage” as the meaning of 
generosity. 
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The empirical literature on the effects of explicit deposit insurance design on bank moral 
hazard provides mixed results and is mostly focused on selected features of the deposit insurance 
system. Early studies in the US tend to find no significant effects (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; Karels 
and McClatchey, 1999). While Gropp and Vesala (2004)’s empirical investigation on European 
countries over the 1990s, finds that the presence of deposit insurance can reduce moral hazard. 
However, most recent studies that employ large international samples find opposite results.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), Laeven (2002), 
Barth et al. (2004), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Forssbaeck (2011) provide evidence 
that deposit insurance exerts an adverse impact on banks’ stability and failures. Similar conclusions 
emerge from the analysis of Ioannidou and Penas (2010) for Bolivia. Whereas Angkinand and 
Wihlborg (2010) find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between deposit coverage and bank risk-
taking in Eastern European and Asian emerging countries. Lambert et al. (2017) in contrast, report 
an increase in US bank risk after the enactment of the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 
October 2008, which augmented the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per 
depositor and bank.  
Some empirical works differentiate the effects of DIS on moral hazard distinguishing between 
crisis and non-crisis years. In a large cross-country study, for example, Anginer et al. (2014) offer 
evidence of a stabilizing effect of deposit insurance schemes when the probability of a bank’s failure 
is particularly high especially over 2007-2009. Similarly, Liu et al. (2016) find not only that banks in 
countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher credit default swaps (CDSs) spreads, 
but also that full coverage exerts a stabilizing effect on bank risk during the financial crisis period. 
Normally, in case of substantial bank distress and risk of systemic crisis in the financial sector, 
policy-makers rely on temporary blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to prevent or end bank runs. 
The effectiveness of such interventions is strictly dependent on their credibility, while their 
implementation may give rise to moral hazard concerns in addition to fiscal costs. Laeven and 
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Valencia (2012) analyse a large international sample of episodes of banking crises and find that 
blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit 
withdrawals from residents, while the same effect is less pronounced for non-residents. Gropp et al. 
(2010; 2013) document that bailouts and guarantees undermine market participants’ monitoring 
incentives and increase bank moral hazard. Nys et al. (2015) provide evidence for a sample of 
commercial Indonesian banks that the switch from a blanket guarantee regime to a formal deposit 
insurance with limited coverage increases market discipline; such an effect, however, being tempered 
by the presence of political connections. 
Only a handful of empirical works have investigated the relationships between several features 
of the insurance deposit schemes and bank stability. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) use an 
international sample over 1980-1997 and show that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank 
stability is stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is 
run by the government rather than by the private sector. 
Hovakimian et al. (2003) employ an international sample and find that the introduction of 
explicit deposit insurance exacerbates bank risk but this phenomenon is mitigated by the contextual 
presence of loss-control mechanisms such as: risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums, co-insurance 
and coverage limits. Cull et al. (2005) use an international dataset capturing a variety of deposit 
insurance features across countries, including coverage, premium structure, etc. and synthesize 
available information by means of principal component indices. Their empirical evidence is 
consistent with the likelihood that generous government-funded deposit insurance might have a 
negative impact on the long-run growth and stability of bank intermediation, except in countries 
where the rule of law is well established and bank supervisors are granted sufficient discretion and 
independence from legal reprisals. Insurance premium requirements on member banks, even when 
risk-adjusted, are instead found to have little effect in restraining banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Liu et 
al. (2016) study the linkage between bank risk and deposit insurance, using data on bank CDSs to 
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measure bank risk for 161 global banks operating in 23 countries over 2000-2011, and show that 
deposit insurance design features such as risk-adjusted premiums and co-insurance tend to lower 
banks’ credit risk. The authors find that government-established systems contribute to lessen the 
adverse impact on bank risk exerted by deposit insurance. 
 
3. Data sample and methodology 
3.1 Data sources and sample 
This study focuses on commercial, cooperative and savings banks operating in 27 EU member 
states. Our sample includes 4,187 banks and covers the period 2003–2013. The countries with the 
largest proportion of commercial banks are France, Germany and the UK; whereas cooperative and 
savings banks are more common in Austria, Germany and Italy.4 
The deposit insurance design features are collected from the cross-country database on bank 
regulation and supervision compiled by the World Bank (2003, 2007, and 2012) and the European 
Commission reports (2004, 2010, and 2011). Bank-specific variables are extracted from the 
BankScope database. Other relevant variables are collected from the EU Banking Structures Reports  
available from the ECB website (namely, the banking sector concentration ratio), Eurostat and the 
World Bank Financial Development Database (for the macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth 
and real GDP per capita). We use annual consolidated bank statements and, when not available, 
unconsolidated statements. This allows us to consider entities, such as large European banking 
groups, whose components, although individually important (in an unconsolidated form), are 
managed according to a unitary and complementary logic at group level.  
 
                                                          
4 Interestingly, Austria, Germany and Italy have also the largest number of listed banks (94% of banks included in our 
sample are unlisted). See Table 5 for the breakdown of observations by bank business model.   
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3.2 Variables description 
To test the hypotheses formulated above, in our empirical models (detailed in Section 3.3) we 
employ as dependent variable our chosen measure of bank stability (Section 3.2.1) and as target 
variables, the DIS features (described in Section 3.2.2). We also  control for selected bank- and 
country-specific characteristics (Section 3.2.3). Table 1 provides brief definitions of all variables . 
Correlation coefficients and their significance levels can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2.1 Measuring bank stability 
The dependent variable in our main models is the Z-score, a measure of bank stability that 
indicates the distance from insolvency (see e.g. Beck and Laeven, 2006). The Z-score is widely used 
and calculated as the sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on average assets (ROAA) scaled 
by the three-year standard deviation of ROAA. It combines accounting measures of profitability, 
leverage and volatility and reflects the number of standard deviations by which returns would have 
to fall from the mean to wipe out bank equity.5 Higher Z-score values indicate a lower probability of 
insolvency risk and thus greater bank ability to face losses. Since the Z-score is highly skewed, we 
                                                          
5  We use this method of calculating the distance-to-default using accounting-based rather than market-based risk 
measures because we include a relatively large number of (unlisted) mutual banks in our sample as, for example, in Hesse 
and Cihák (2007); Garcia-Marco and Roblez-Fernandez (2008); Beck et al. (2009); Laeven and Levine (2009); 
Chiaramonte et al. (2015a,b; 2016). De Nicolo (2000) and Stiroh, (2004a and 2004b) use the Z-score as a measure of risk-
adjusted performance. There are different ways of calculating the Z-score (Boyd et al. 2006; Yeyati and Micco, 2007; 
Delis et al. 2012) and indeed of financial stability risk, as shown e.g. in Aikman et al. (2018) that use a range of indicators 
to produce composite measures of stability. 
11 
 
use its natural logarithm (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Liu et al., 2016). To mitigate the effects of 
outliers, Z-score is winsorized at the 1% of each tail.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the decomposition of the Z-score by year over 
2003-2013. During the most acute phase of the crisis its average values dropped considerably, 
reaching its lowest value (4.176) in 2009 compared to 4.230 in the previous period. This is due to 
both the decline in operating profit and the increase in the volatility of returns (σROAA). In 2011-
2013, the average Z-score rose from 4.577 to 4.791, thus reaching values higher than the pre-crisis 
years. One possible explanation is the significant deleveraging process that many banks have 
embarked on since the global crisis, and that resulted in greater total equity as a proportion of total 
assets. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Using the Z-score as a measure of distance to default, entails the possibility of the results being driven 
by one of its components. Hence, we test our hypotheses using as dependent variables ETA, ROAA 
and the standard deviation of ROAA. For additional robustness, we also replace the Z-score with the 
Tier 1 capital ratio (TIER1 RATIO) and a proxy of credit quality (loan loss reserves to gross loans, 
LLR_GL). 
 
3.2.2 Deposit insurance design features: coverage, funding & administration, and intervention 
We consider three sets of DIS design features that reflect the nature of national DIS design, 
namely: the degree of deposit coverage provided by national DIS; the bank contribution to the DIS 
and its administration; and the power of intervention of the DIS on the banks and their management.  
To verify H1, on the effect of generosity of deposit insurance on bank stability, we use three 
measures: (1) the coverage ratio (COV_RATIO), that is equal to the amount of deposits refunded in 
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the event of bank failure scaled by the national GDP per capita, and its square (COV_RATIO2);6 (2) 
an aggregate explanatory variable COVERAGE, that corresponds to the sum of the dummy variables 
HIGH_COV and NO_COINS (see Table 1); and (3) the effect of blanket guarantees (BLANKET). 
We hypothesize a negative relationship between the above measures of generosity and the Z-score 
because too generous DIS could raise bank risk both in normal and bad times.   
Panel A of Table 3 reports the national levels of deposit insurance coverage (in euros and 
scaled by real GDP per capita); the dummies HIGH_COV and NO_COINS in 2003, 2008, and 2013. 
Overall, it is possible to see a substantial increase, albeit unevenly spread over time and across 
countries. The harmonization of the coverage levels to €100,000 amplifies the national disparities in 
terms of generosity of the DIS. The dummy HIGH_COV does not change over time as the deposit 
insurance coverages are lower than the annual mean values only for four countries: Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden.7 Additionally, co-insurance (NO_COINS), rather common 
prior to the crisis, was largely abandoned over 2008-2009. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The second independent variable, FUNDING & ADMIN, is obtained summing up the 
following four features: source of funding (GOV_FUND), the timing of bank contribution to the 
insurance fund (NO_EXANTE), the differential premium system in force (NO_RISKADJ), and the 
                                                          
6 Since the coverage ratios are highly skewed, we use their natural logarithm. 
7 Some EU countries (i.e., Germany and Austria) set up mutual and voluntary schemes advertised as offering unlimited 
depositors’ guarantees. Despite this, for example, the German government declared political unlimited deposit guarantees. 
For more details, see European Commission (2010).  
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administration of the DIS (GOV_ADMIN).8 Based on our second hypothesis, H2, we expect negative 
signs, because banks may be more prone to take risks if national DIS generate moral hazard 
incentives, i.e. if premia are not risk-adjusted, the timing of bank contribution is not set clearly, or the 
administration and funding of the DIS is public. Table 3, panel B, shows that for most EU27 DIS, the 
funds are entirely provided by banks and only a handful of countries (namely, Austria, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, and United Kingdom) adopt ex-post premia. Contributions are usually not 
risk-adjusted while the governance of the national DIS rests on governments, sometimes jointly with 
banks. 
To test for H3, the third aggregate independent variable, INTERVENTION, encapsulates the 
ability of the deposit insurer itself to discipline and act against banks. It includes: the lack of power 
of intervention on bank members (NO_INTERV); the inability to cancel or revoke deposit insurance 
for any participating bank (NO_CANCEL); and the inability to take legal actions against banks’ 
directors/officials involved in bank failures (NO_LEGALPWR).9 If deposit insurers do not exercise 
any disciplinary power over banks, bank stability should be weaker. Hence, a negative sign is 
expected. Table 3, panel C, reveals that only a handful of EU27 countries allow DIS interventions on 
banks. It also shows a widespread absence of deposit insurers’ ‘sole’ power to cancel the provision 
for any banks and to take legal actions, as these powers are typically shared with supervisory and 
judicial authorities.   
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
                                                          
8 For the case of Germany the variable GOV_ADMIN takes the value 1 for savings and pure public banks and 0 for 
private commercial and cooperative banks. 
9 Surveyed banks were also asked whether the national insurance authority has ever actually taken legal actions against 
bank directors or officials. We omitted this last variable from the analysis, since there is no way to ascertain whether legal 
actions were not taken either because never needed or due to laxity on the part of the authority.  
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In our empirical specifications we control for bank- (size, capitalisation, reliance towards 
deposits, efficiency, income diversification and credit risk) and country-specific characteristics (bank 
industry concentration, economic growth and institutional quality, as proxied by the GDP per capita, 
similarly to Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010) that may affect bank stability. Table 1 reports their 
definitions and expected signs. Typically, the level of bank capitalisation, efficiency, income 
diversification and asset quality as well as the macro variables have been found to be positively related 
to bank stability in the relevant literature (e.g., see Stiroh, 2004a; Angkinand  and Wihlborg, 2010; 
Chiaramonte et al., 2015b; Anginer et al., 2014). Whereas, for other variable like size, business 
models and banking market conditions, the relationships are far from straightforward (e.g. Fiordelisi 
and Mare, 2014; Mare, 2015; Becchetti et al., 2016).   
To mitigate the effect of outliers, all control variables are winsorized in the outside 1% of each 
tail. Finally, we include a  dummy controlling for financial and sovereign crises (CRISIS), which 
takes the value of 1 for the years 2008-2013, and 0 otherwise.10 Summary statistics and tests of the 
differences in means between the pre-crisis and crisis period are reported in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The average values of CIR, DIV, and HHI remained virtually unchanged for our sample of 
banks over the period under investigation (where statistically significant differences are small). Bank 
SIZE appear to have increased significantly on average in the crisis years, possibly driven by the 
process of consolidation. Equally, the deterioration of the quality of banks’ credit portfolios after the 
                                                          
10 We identified an alternative timeline of the financial crisis starting in the third quarter of 2007 (Bank for International 
Settlements - BIS, 2009); using quarterly data collected from BankScope database, we ensured the robustness of our 
empirical results to this different specification.  
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outbreak of the crisis led to a substantial increase in the LLR_GL variable. The average value of 
GDP_PC also rose significantly during the crisis years, especially in countries less affected by the 
financial and sovereign crises.  
In contrast, DEP_TA and ΔGDP declined on average in the crisis years, possibly as a result 
of lower depositor confidence on the stability of the banking sector and the contraction in the main 
determinants of demand, respectively. We also observed a reduction in bank leverage (i.e. higher 
values of ETA). This is largely explained by both the deleveraging process and recapitalisation of 
many European banks in the wake of the financial crisis. Focusing on the difference in means between 
the two sub-periods, we find that with only one exception, for our control variables it is possible to 
identify a statistically significant change during the crisis.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the correlation matrix of all DIS features used in the 
empirical analyses. Although most pairwise correlation coefficients are statistically significant the 
correlation magnitudes are usually relatively low. 
 
3.3 Empirical models 
Our methodology is composed of two steps. The first is described in our baseline model (Eq. 
1) and explores possible non-linearities in the relationship between coverage and bank stability (H1); 
as well the relationship between the latter and other deposit insurance features, namely FUNDING & 
ADMIN  (H2) and INTERVENTION (H3) in their additive terms.  
For the empirical analysis we employ the following fixed-effects panel data regression model:  
 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1COV_RATIO𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2COV_RATIO2𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗  𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +
𝛽3COV_RATIO𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽4COV_RATIO2𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 & 𝐴𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +
𝛽6𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 & 𝐴𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +
𝛽9𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛽10𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                                  
(1) 
16 
 
 
where Z-scoreij,t is the main stability measure of bank i in country j at time t. The explanatory variables 
COV_RATIOj,t-1  and COV_RATIO2j,t-1 are, respectively, the natural logarithm of the deposit 
insurance coverage scaled by the real GDP per capita and its square in country j at time t-1. In 
addition, we include the remaining deposit insurance scheme design features in their additive form 
(FUNDING & ADMINj,t-1 and INTERVENTIONj,t-1). It is to note that the variable co-insurance 
(NO_COINS) is not included in this model due to collinearity.  
Following Anginer et al. (2014)’s empirical strategy, the DIS design features are interacted 
with the pre-crisis (2003-2007) and crisis years (2008-2013) dummies, respectively. Since we also 
include the crisis dummy (CRISIS) in our model, the coefficients on the interaction terms should be 
interpreted as the differences in distance-to-default of banks which are operating in a given DIS 
setting and those without. We also include bank- (BankControlsij,t-1) and country-specific 
characteristics (CountryControlsij,t-1) that are expected to significantly affect banks’ stability. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year to alleviate any reverse causality problem. The standard 
errors are clustered at the bank-level. Finally, 𝛼𝑖 is the bank fixed-effects and εij,t is the error term. To 
strengthen the validity of our findings we run a set of further analyses and robustness checks in 
Sections 4 and 5.  
The second step involves identifying the effect of the aggregate design features of EU27 
deposit insurance schemes on banks’ stability employing the following fixed-effects panel data 
regression: 
 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡    (2) 
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where the dummies DesignFeatures j,t-1, representing the single DIS features or the three aggregate 
dummies COVERAGE, FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION in country j at time t-1, are 
interacted with the pre-crisis and crisis years dummies. We further control for the set of bank and 
country characteristics used in the baseline model. 
 
4. Main Results 
4.1 The baseline model 
Table 5 reports the results of the baseline model described in eq. (1) that is a panel regression 
for the full sample over the period 2003-2013 using COV_RATIO and its quadratic transformation 
(COV_RATIO2). In an additive form, the variables FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION are 
also added to account for national characterization of DIS across the sample and over time. We 
interact all the variables of interest with the dummies pre-crisis and crisis and exclude co-insurance 
due to collinearity. We also include in the model the control variables related to bank-specific and 
country-specific factors, plus the dummy crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Focusing on the results in panel A (Types of banks) evidence suggests the presence of a 
significant inverse U-shaped relationship between coverage and bank stability for ‘All banks’.11  
This is also illustrated by the fitted values plotted in Figure 1, both in the pre-crisis and crisis 
period.  
 
                                                          
11 We carry out the same test for the following three subsamples: 1) with quarterly data; 2) with consolidated data; and 3) 
excluding Germany. Results are qualitative similar to those presented and omitted for brevity.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]  
 
Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) provide similar results in a study focusing on 52 emerging 
and developing European and Asian countries in 1997-2003. Our findings in the first column ‘All 
banks’ imply that high level of deposit coverage, especially during crisis periods, in an attempt to 
limit systemic runs, could in fact encourage bank risk-taking. Thus, caution should be paid in setting 
a suitable level of deposit coverage to real GDP per capita.  
The identified quadratic relationship allows us to calculate the turning point and estimate that 
during the crisis period the level of coverage (not in natural logarithm) at which the Z-score starts 
diminishing is 3.6 times the real GDP per capita.12 In our sample at the end of 2013, all Eastern 
European countries as well as Portugal (6.33), Greece (6.06), Malta (5.81), Cyprus (5.26), Italy (3.91), 
Spain (4.48) exhibit coverage ratios above the identified turning point and country differences 
increased after 2010, in light of the common coverage equal to €100,000 per depositor (see Table 3). 
Such evidence raises concerns about the potential distortions that deposit coverage heterogeneity 
among European countries may have in the long-run.   
In periods of financial instability, the role of deposit insurance is considered by the authorities 
as an effective mechanism to prevent bank runs. However, implementing upward adjustments of 
coverage over time ignoring GDP and inflation may imply that depositors ‘slack off’ their discipline, 
leaving room for risky bank conduct that needs to be adequately prevented through tighter 
supervision. Indeed, the coverage limit should not be too low to create incentives for pre-emptive 
depositor runs and not too high to discourage large depositors and sophisticated creditors to discipline 
their bank. For the remaining aggregate DIS variables, we find that FUNDING & ADMIN and 
                                                          
12 For example, if the average GDP_PC in EU27 over 2008-13 is equal to €24,136 and the turning point is 3.6, the € 
amount of deposit insurance from which bank stability starts to decrease corresponds to around €87,000.  
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INTERVENTION, when significant are negative consistently with the expectations set out in our 
hypotheses H2 and H3.  
Table 5, panel A, also reveals that more capitalized banks (as expressed by the control variable 
ETA) and with a greater dependence from customer deposits (DEP_TA), tend to be more stable and 
sound, possibly because of the greater degree of discipline exerted by shareholders and depositors on 
banks’ conduct. Consistently with Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010), we verify whether shareholders’ 
risk-taking incentives are reduced with increased equity financing, whose exogenous nature is due to 
capital requirements. The results concerning our measure of the reliance on bank deposits (DEP_TA) 
appear in line with Anginer et al. (2014), as higher funding dependency from bank deposits alleviates 
bank risk. As expected, an increase in CIR (i.e. lower efficiency) corresponds to a reduction in bank 
stability; although this latter seem to be increasing with size and banking market concentration (HHI). 
The literature of concentration and stability in banking is not straightforward (Udhe and Heimeshoff, 
2009). The positive and significant coefficient of the variable HHI, lends support to the 
“concentration-stability” view, which suggests that larger banks in concentrated banking systems may 
increase profits and decrease financial fragility by providing higher capital buffers that safeguard 
them against external shocks. Banking markets characterised by a handful of large institutions, are 
also expected to be easier to supervise and monitor.  
Unsurprisingly, a better quality of the loan portfolio, as reflected by decreasing values of the 
variable LLR_GL, is positively associated with bank stability. In all models, the coefficients of the 
variables representing economic growth (ΔGDP) and institutional quality, as proxied by GPD_PC, 
when significant are positive, as expected. The role played by national institutional settings in 
mitigating or aggravating the potential for banks’ moral hazard related to deposit insurance is of 
critical interest in the empirical analysis. Consistently with Hovakimian et al. (2003), Cull et al. 
(2005), and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006), our results indicate that countries with a strong institutional 
environment are not affected by additional instability due to deposit insurance adoption. However, 
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they may become unstable if the entire safety net design is inadequate and/or supervision and 
prudential regulation are weak.13 
Table 5, panel A, also reports the results by business models (commercial vs cooperative and 
savings), size (small vs large) and degree of dependency from customer deposits. We find evidence 
that the U-shaped relationship between the coverage ratio and stability holds for all bank types. The 
magnitude of the coefficients, however, suggests that bank behaviour can differ considerably across 
business models. This seems evident during the crisis as the turning point value of the coverage ratio 
is equal to 4.25 for commercial banks and 3 for cooperative and savings, thus implying that these 
latter became riskier for lower levels of the ratio during the crisis. One possible explanation is that 
commercial banks typically have a greater degree of asset diversification and governance mechanisms 
more subject to market discipline compared to their mutual and savings counterparts. The coefficients 
of FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION are significant and show the expected signs for the 
sub-sample of cooperative and savings banks, indicating the relevance that these additional DIS 
design mechanisms may have in curbing moral hazard of which the so-called stakeholder-oriented 
banks are not immune. 
Evidence of a non-linear effect of COV_RATIO is also found for large banks during the crisis 
period, and the point at which their stability starts to decline equals 5.71. For large banks the 
relationship between DIS features and stability can be related to ‘too-big-to fail’ arguments and the 
presence of more intense external monitoring and supervision. Additionally, in highly concentrated 
banking systems, dominated by few large banks, higher deposit coverage ratios may be suitable to 
prevent bank runs. This evidence contrasts with the conventional idea that deposit insurance benefits 
more small riskier banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006). For these latter we find that FUNDING & 
                                                          
13 We also carried out a test excluding the country-level control variables (HHI, ΔGDP, and GDP_PC) and using country 
fixed effects instead, in addition to bank fixed-effects. Results remain unchanged and are available upon request. 
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ADMIN mechanisms as well as the powers of intervention of the deposit insurer are essential to 
maintain their stability, especially in times of financial turmoil. 
We also find that in normal times the non-linear effect of coverage limits is only significant 
for banks with low reliance on customer deposits. During crisis, there is evidence of non-linearities 
for both groups of banks, however the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the effect is slightly 
stronger for banks with the lowest dependency on traditional deposits. However the turning points 
are not very different: 2.82 (2.73) for banks with the lowest (highest) dependency. Furthermore, in 
the case of greater reliance on customer deposits, we find that the structuring of the characteristics of 
funding, administration and intervention powers of DIS play an important role in counteracting 
instability due to bank moral hazard, especially during financial crises. 
Table 5, panel B (Operating environment) shows that at least during periods of crisis, there is 
evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the variables of interest, for banks located in 
‘no-GIIPS countries’, that is the subsample that excludes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
In particular, while in healthy economies in normal times deposit coverage contributes positively to 
bank stability, in crisis periods, if excessive, it may yield the opposite result (the turning point is 7.65 
times the real GDP_PC). We also find support to H2 and H3, as expressed by the negative and 
significant coefficients of the variables FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION. This seems to 
indicate that even in the healthiest countries, poorly-designed DIS can weaken incentives for good 
governance for banks and lead to a deterioration in the soundness of the banking system. Similarly, 
for banks operating in strongly bank -oriented financial systems, excessive deposit coverage ratios 
can result in losses in terms of stability, especially in stormy times; however, the turning point is a 
relatively high 7.62.  
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The last two columns of Panel B show the estimates obtained according to the level of 
supervisory power for the 27 EU countries.14 Our evidence indicates the presence of quadratic 
relationships in the pre-crisis period only for banks located in countries where supervisors’ power is 
below average; while, unexpectedly, the effect of deposit insurance is always positive and not 
quadratic in the crisis period. In countries with a low sophistication of supervisory power, the deposit 
insurer’s intervention capabilities are important in containing bank instability, especially in difficult 
times. In these environments, size appear to be associated with a lower degree of stability, probably 
due to a lower effectiveness of the supervision activity. In countries where the supervisory power is 
greatest, it becomes important to carefully establish deposit coverage levels that minimize moral 
hazard incentives.  
 
4.2 Tests for the individual effects of DIS’s selected features 
Table 6 reports the results for the full sample over 2003-2013. First, we run the  model 
described in eq. (2) considering as target variables the three aggregate variables COVERAGE, 
FUNDING & ADMIN, and INTERVENTION (column I). Then, in models (II), (III), and (IV), we 
disaggregate them alternatively into their single components. All models include the control variables 
related to bank- and country-specific factors, plus the crisis dummy. 
Our findings show positive, although decreasing, significant coefficients for the variable 
COVERAGE (COV_SUM), both before and after the outbreak of the financial crisis, as shown in 
models (I) and (III). In model (IV) COV_SUM is positive and significant only when it is interacted 
with the crisis dummy. This finding is in contrast with our expectation, and suggests that deposit 
                                                          
14 Bank supervisory power is a proxy for the strength of supervision in each country (see e.g. Buch and DeLong, 2008 for 
an application). This variable ranges from 0 to 14, where the higher the score, the greater the supervisory power. Data on 
supervisory power are collected from the cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision compiled by the 
World Bank (2003, 2007, and 2012). 
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insurance reduces bank risk especially during the recent crisis, and it is in line with Anginer et al. 
(2014). Similar evidence is provided by Liu et al. (2016) who argue that deposit insurance helps 
stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis. However, the single components 
of the variable COV_SUM in model (II), suggest that these results are driven by the variable 
NO_COINS. As expected, high levels of deposit coverage (HIGH_COV) weakened more bank 
stability during the crisis period; while pre-crisis the coefficient is negative and insignificant. Similar 
results are obtained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).  
The absence of co-insurance appears to make banks less risky, given the positive sign of the 
coefficients in both periods and the higher magnitude registered in the crisis period. Such evidence 
contrasts with Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Hovakimian et al., (2003), and more recently 
Liu et el. (2016). We also find that the positive effect exerted by NO_COINS on bank stability 
dominates that of the dummy HIGH_COV.  
In theory, the absence of co-insurance should increase bank risk (Barth et al., 2013). One 
possible reason for these unexpected results is that episodes of bank runs, which cause instability of 
sound banks may be aggravated by the presence of co-insurance mechanisms, as it seems to emerge 
from the magnitude of the coefficient of the variable NO_COINS *crisis. As co-insured depositors 
perceive that their deposits are at risk, they will run to banks in order to avoid to be only partially 
reimbursed in case of bank failure. Such a phenomenon may be more pronounced in countries where 
deposits represent a relatively larger portion of bank liabilities. In recent years co-insurance has been 
largely abandoned in many countries (see Table 3) as set out in the 2009/14/EC Directive. Thus our 
results confirm the validity of the removal of the variable co-insurance from the remaining empirical 
analysis. 
Based on our first research hypothesis, our findings suggest that more protective DIS do not 
overall intensify bank risk-taking. However, we find that this effect is brought about by relatively low 
levels of coverage and the absence of co-insurance mechanisms, whose presence may undermine 
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depositors’ trust in the safety and soundness of their banks. These results appear to hold in different 
market scenarios, calm and turbulent, but show different degrees of intensity.  
The second DIS aggregate variable, FUNDING & ADMIN, is significant only during the crisis 
period and presents the expected negative sign in all models. This suggests that, in line with 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), funding and administration of DIS significantly reduce the 
soundness of banks possibly by inducing greater bank moral hazard. Focusing on the decomposition 
of FUNDING & ADMIN (column III), with only one exception (GOV_ADMIN), the significant 
variables are negative. Our results provide supportive elements for the IADI’s recommendations 
(2013c) and recent rules introduced by the novel 2014/49/EC Directive concerning the effectiveness 
of ex-ante funding mechanism as a risk minimizing DIS feature. Regarding the absence of risk-
adjusted premia in the crisis period, our results are in line with Liu et al.’s (2016), who also find 
evidence on the effectiveness of risk-adjusted premia as a risk-minimizing feature.   
In contrast, we observe a positive and significant coefficient of the feature GOV_FUND, but 
only during the pre-crisis period. Reliance on government funding may have a double, contrasting 
effect: on the one hand it provides incentives to moral hazard if banks are not properly charged for 
the insurance of the deposits collected; on the other, it prevents bank runs which may originate from 
mistrust of depositors in the ability of the insurer to pay its liabilities. However, in both cases 
discipline on bank behaviour is severely compromised (Kane, 1991) and long-run economic growth 
opportunities may be negatively affected. An exception to these adverse consequences induced by 
generous government-funded deposit insurance might be found, as noted by Cull et al. (2005), in 
countries where the rule of law is well established and bank supervisors are granted sufficient 
discretion and independence. Equally, government funding should be considered essential (Morrison 
and White, 2011), or act as additional backup funding (Garcia, 1999), when the soundness of the 
financial sector is uncertain. 
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Overall, according to our second research hypothesis, we find that only in the crisis period 
those DIS that are more inclined to encourage bank moral hazard negatively affect bank soundness. 
Results are especially robust in countries characterized by the absence of risk-adjusted premia. 
The third aggregate variable, INTERVENTION, is always significant and has the expected 
negative sign in all models. This suggests that bank risk increases when the administration of the 
national DIS lacks itself the power to cancel, intervene or take legal actions against the managers of 
failed banks.  
Before the Directive 94/19/EC (the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive, DGSD) and the 
Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD) establishing  the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the set-up of such  powers was generally left to national discretion: 
powers were held by or shared among different national supervisory authorities, the judicial system 
and the DIS. After the outburst of the global financial crisis, the clarity of roles, coordination and 
appropriate and timely information sharing have become crucial to ensure the effectiveness of actions 
among all the components of the financial safety net. With the recent directives, the European 
legislator has provided a more precise definition of the powers of the deposit insurer and on the 
sharing of the same between the different authorities that are part of the national and supranational 
financial safety net. The regulatory harmonization efforts aim to eliminate national fragmentation 
although there are still some grey areas due to the national discretions allowed by the regulations.  
Looking at the single components of the variable INTERVENTION, we find significant and 
negatively increasing coefficients for the variables NO_INTERV and NO_CANCEL in the examined 
periods. In addition, NO_LEGALPWR is significant only in the period preceding the outburst of the 
financial crisis and shows the expected negative sign. In sum, according to our third hypothesis, we 
find significant support to the negative effects of DIS’ features on bank stability. 
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Such powers are generally held by national supervisory authorities or are strictly shared by 
DIS with bank supervisors and consistently exerted by the deposit insurers.15 Looking at the single 
components of the variable INTERVENTION, we find significant and negatively increasing 
coefficients for the variables NO_INTERV and NO_CANCEL in the examined periods. In addition, 
NO_LEGALPWR is significant only in the period preceding the outburst of the financial crisis and 
shows the expected negative sign. 
In sum, according to our third hypothesis, we find significant support to the negative effects 
of DIS’ features on bank stability. The possibility of the deposit insurance authority to intervene a 
bank, the ability of the deposit insurer to cancel banks, and in part, the possibility of the authorities 
to take legal action against banks’ directors/officials, seem to be associated with higher bank 
soundness, regardless of  the market conditions.16 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3 Accounting for blanket guarantees 
During the period 2008 to 2010, eight countries17 temporarily introduced blanket guarantees, 
either by law (as in Denmark and Ireland), or by public declaration of the government (as for example 
in Germany, Greece and Hungary) stating that all private savings were guaranteed. 
                                                          
15 It is worth noting that especially in times of crisis, the existence of an interventionist set-up may render banks riskier 
as the threat of cancellation from the DIS or other forms of intervention on bank management may, on the one hand, push 
managers to engage in whitewashing practices to hide risky activities and/or, on the other hand, promote bank runs if 
depositors feel that their deposits are becoming unsafe. In this latter case, even sound banks can be threatened by the 
depositors’ fear that banks may be in danger as news of intervention of the deposit insurance agency spread out.  
16 Results also hold with an alternative specification where DIS aggregate features are interacted with the sole dummy 
CRISIS. 
17 Namely, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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In this section we verify whether bank exposure to risk is amplified by the introduction of 
unlimited guarantees. Table 7 provides the results on the effect of blanket guarantees on banks’ 
stability over the period 2008-2010. The dichotomous variable BLANKET takes the value of one for 
those countries which fully guaranteed their national deposits in the most frantic period of the crisis. 
As key explanatory aggregate variables we consider FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION and 
exclude the aggregate coverage variable as the blanket already guarantees full coverage by definition. 
According to the empirical results, this temporary emergency measure, sizably increased the banks’ 
soundness avoiding that panic among depositors could affect even healthy banks, as suggested by 
Garcia (1999). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4 Risk taking incentives and deposit insurance reforms over 2008-2010 
We also consider the effects of the magnitude of regulatory changes occurred in deposit 
insurance from 2008 to 2010 on bank stability vis à vis the pre-crisis national levels of coverage. We 
categorize as ‘AFFECTED’ (‘unaffected’) those banks located in countries that experienced a change 
in COV_RATIO equal or above (below) the mean of all changes occurred in 2010.  
To test whether the effect of changes in deposit coverage varied according to the level existing 
in each EU country prior to 2008, we employed the variable HIGH_COV07, which takes the value 
of 1 if the coverage ratio in 2007 is equal or above the annual mean values, 0 otherwise (see Table 
8). We further interact the two variables (AFFECTED*HIGH_COV07) to isolate those countries with 
a coverage ratio exceeding the mean in 2007 and that additionally experienced a change in coverage 
above the mean in 2010. This subsample of countries, which should experience the highest moral 
hazard risk, represents the treatment sample. 
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We use an ordinary least square regression and control for year and country fixed-effects. The 
country fixed effects net out any time-invariant unobserved country-specific factors, while the year 
fixed effects difference away trends that influence affected and unaffected banks. We use a cluster-
robust sandwich estimator where the standard errors allow for interbank correlation through time, 
relaxing the usual requirement for the observations to be independent across and within individual 
banks.  
Table 8 shows that the variables AFFECTED and HIGH_COV07 have a strong, positive and 
significant effect on banks’ stability. Their interaction, in contrast, seems to have the opposite effect.  
These findings are in line with our previous analyses: large changes in coverage during the crisis and 
high level of COV_RATIO prior to the crisis per se enhance bank stability, but the too generous 
combined provisions of these two variables can be detrimental to banks’ soundness even though the 
overall effect remains positive in turbulent times.   
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Robustness tests  
 In line with the literature, we test the robustness of our main findings by using different 
measures of bank stability (Casu and Sarkisyan, 2010; Schaeck and Cihak, 2014). We first regress 
the independent and control variables employed in the baseline model against the three components 
of the Z-score: ETA; ROAA and σROAA (see columns 1-3 of Table 9). Then, we use two further 
proxies of the Z-Score: the TIER1 RATIO and the quality of the loan portfolio (LLR_GL).  
Interestingly, Table 9 shows that in the crisis period the presence of a high coverage ratio 
makes bank profitability more volatile, as proxied by the standard deviation of ROAA. Other results 
on capitalization levels (ETA) and level of intervention are usually consistent with our main findings 
reported in Table 5. 
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
In addition, with reference to the variable LLR_GL, we find that excessive levels of deposit 
coverage determine an increase in bank risk, a possible cause of instability, most likely due to reckless 
lending policies. The weakness of the intervention powers of the depository insurer also contributes 
to increasing the bank’s riskiness. The quadratic effect of the deposit insurance coverage is not found 
when TIER1 RATIO is the dependent variable, as in the case of ETA. Unexpectedly, we find that, 
albeit weakly, the FUNDING & ADMIN variables present a positive and meaningful sign, both before 
and after 2008. Looking at the effect of the individual components of the FUNDING & ADMIN 
variable, not reported here for the sake of brevity, we find that banks are more able to deal with risks 
with their capital in two circumstances: when the financing and administration of DIS are public 
during the period preceding the outbreak of the global financial crisis; and when insurance premium 
systems are not risk adjusted after 2008. This last result appears compatible with those circumstances 
in which the worsening of the macroeconomic situation and the consequent increase in risks do not 
translate into an increase in insurance costs, thus leaving to banks more room to increase regulatory 
capital endowments. A similar situation occurs when funding and management of DIS does not fall 
on participating banks.18 
                                                          
18 Before the deposit coverage harmonization in EU, the host-country control rule for foreign branches and subsidiaries 
could potentially interfere with the incentives created by the national regulations in terms of deposit coverage. Data 
available on foreign branches are very poor. However, to at least partially address this issue, we isolate those EU countries 
in which European banking groups could have had incentives to open subsidiaries, due to their lower level of deposit 
insurance before 2009, such as Central and Eastern European Countries. We then tested whether this potential “arbitrage” 
affected bank stability, but we found no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. We thank an anonymous referee 
for suggesting this test. These findings, omitted for brevity, are available with the authors upon request. 
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We also check and found evidence to the parallel trend assumption, as for example in Calderon 
and Schaeck (2016), that holds that in absence of treatment (the increase in deposit insurance 
throughout 2008-2010) changes in bank stability are similar for banks benefiting from pre-existing 
high or low deposit coverage. Additionally, following the authors, we adopt a Cox (1972) 
proportional hazard model to verify that the increase of deposit insurance coverage above average 
over the period 2008-2010, proxied by the treatment variable AFFECTED, and the introduction of a 
blanket guarantee (BLANKET) are exogenous with respect to bank stability, measured by the Z-
score.  
The independent variable coefficient denotes the hazard of observing above average deposit 
insurance coverage increase and blanket guarantees. Our analysis is conducted at country level. 
Countries are dropped from the analysis once they experience the intervention of interest. Our sample 
period covers the period 2003 – 2010 as deposit coverage increases and blanket guarantees were made 
within 2010. The measure of bank stability, the Z-score, remains insignificant, thus suggesting that 
bank stability is not driving the variables AFFECTED and BLANKET. The results, not included in 
Table 10, hold even introducing the variables FUNDING & ADMIN and INTERVENTION. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
  
6. Conclusions 
This paper sets out to explore the effect of national deposit insurance features on bank stability 
in Europe and to empirically verify the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between 
coverage and bank stability both in crisis and normal times. We conjecture that just focusing on the 
role of coverage and its optimal value when assessing the impact of deposit insurance on risk-taking 
incentives is too restrictive. The features of DIS are generally expected to enhance depositors’ 
confidence. Although this may not be at work during periods of high instability, such as at the peak 
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of the crisis when the effects may even be reversed, in normal times too generous schemes may 
promote bank risk-taking and make financial systems vulnerable to crises.  
We employ a detailed set of European Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS) features for 27 EU 
countries and distinguish between a pre-crisis (2003-2007) and financial and euro sovereign debt 
crisis period (2008-2013). We test three main hypotheses based on the premises that bank stability 
will decrease when deposit insurance is excessively protective, if the structure of the funding and 
administration of national DIS generate moral hazard incentives and when deposit insurers have no 
adequate power of intervention on banks.  
The European case is of particular interest because national governments for 15 years, up until 
the introduction of the 2009 and 2014 Directives, benefited from significant discretion in the DIS 
design and there was only a minimum degree of harmonisation across European countries. Much 
more shared common rules and the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), 
the third pillar to complete the Banking Union, have become essential to foster financial integration 
and stability in Europe.  
For our empirical analysis we employ fixed-effects panel data models with lagged explanatory 
variables to alleviate possible simultaneity problems alongside a battery of thorough robustness 
checks and multiple specifications. Our results suggest that more protective DIS do not necessarily 
lead to greater bank risk. However, during the crisis some features that generate moral hazard 
incentives can decrease bank stability. We find an inverse U-shaped relation with bank stability 
decreasing at high levels of coverage during the crisis period. Our evidence also indicate that the 
introduction of temporary measures like blanket guarantees are crucial to avoid panic among 
depositors and restore stability in turbulent times.  
Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that DIS design matters when assessing the impact 
of deposit insurance and stability, and proves that ignoring the simultaneous and incremental effects 
of DIS features may lead to inaccurate and partial conclusions. In particular, our empirical analysis 
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demonstrates that the net result of the mix of deposit insurance features on banks’ stability depends 
on whether the safety net effect can outweigh the various moral hazard incentives of the DIS features. 
Our evidence also demonstrates that the generosity of deposit insurance coverage is not detrimental, 
per se, because it restrains the potential for bank runs but it should progressively fine-tune itself and 
with the other features characterizing a DIS.  
Compared to bank managers and shareholders, depositors are typically less able to distinguish 
between safe and unsafe banking institutions. One of the key lessons from the recent financial turmoil 
is that depositors have limited ability to exercise market discipline or mitigate moral hazard during a 
crisis. In terms of policy, our study has allowed to retrospectively assess the goodness of regulatory 
novelties introduced by the latest (2014) EU Directive, thus providing evidence of their suitability in 
preserving bank soundness. It has also demonstrated that the stabilizing effect of deposit insurance 
can be different along different bank characteristics and business models and is influenced by the 
environment within which it operates. This has been recognised in recent relevant policy documents 
(e.g. IADI, 2013; 2014) and includes macroeconomic conditions as well as other country-specific 
aspects, such as the strength of the sovereign, the financial system structure, and the prudential 
regulatory settings.   
One of the main implications for regulators from our study is that an optimal DIS that 
minimizes moral hazard incentives may require a dynamic approach. This is particularly important 
in light of the needed progress in the third pillar of the Banking Union for the eurozone countries that 
implies a single deposit insurance scheme and elements of risk sharing. Ideally, policy-makers and 
regulators should review and adapt coverage limits taking into account the economic cycle and 
considering current and future trends in the supply of and demand for traditional banking products 
and, crucially, their quality. However, announcements of reduction of coverage may not be easy to 
implement particularly in bank-based financial systems. 
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Overall, the key message of this study is that DIS should focus more on maintaining financial 
stability and be sufficiently flexible to account for local conditions. Despite the process of 
harmonisation, eurozone countries are still quite diverse in terms of overall riskiness of their banking 
sectors and in their institutional settings, culture, history as well as legal and judicial frameworks. 
This suggests that there could be potential vulnerabilities in the creation of a common EU deposit 
insurance framework based on a ‘one size fits all’.  
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Table 1 - Variable definitions and expected relationships vs bank stability 
 
This table describes the explanatory variables used in our model and summarizes their hypothesized relationships with 
the dependent variable (bank stability).  
Variable name Definition Source Expected sign 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
Z-score The natural logarithm of the Z-score calculated as the 
sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on 
average assets (ROAA) scaled by the three-year 
standard deviation of ROAA (σROAA). 
BankScope / 
DESIGN FEATURES    
COV_RATIO  The natural logarithm of the Euros amount of 
deposits refunded in case of bank failure scaled by 
the real GDP per capita. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative  
COV_RATIO2 The square of COV_RATIO. Own computation Positive/Negative 
    
HIGH_COV Equals 1 if the natural logarithm of the Euros amount 
of deposits refunded in case of bank failure scaled by 
the real GDP per capita (i.e. COV_RATIO) is equal 
or above the annual mean values, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
NO_COINS Equals 1 when there is no co-insurance, 0 otherwise. World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
COVERAGE Sum of HIGH_COV and NO_COINS. Own computation Negative 
GOV_FUND Equals 1 when solely government or jointly banks 
and government provide the source of funding, 0 
when the funds are entirely provided by banks. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
NO_EXANTE Equals 1 for ex-post contribution, 0 for ex-ante 
contributions. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
NO_RISKADJ Equals 1 when the premia are not risk-adjusted, 0 
otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
GOV_ADMIN Equals 1 if the insurance fund is administered solely 
by the government or jointly by banks and 
government, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
FUNDING & ADMIN Sum of GOV_FUND, NO_EXANTE, 
NO_RISKADJ and GOV_ADMIN. 
Own computation Negative 
NO_INTERV Equals 1 if the insurance authority has not the power 
to intervene a bank, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
NO_CANCEL Equals 1 if the insurance authority has not the power 
to cancel or revoke membership of deposit insurance 
schemes for any participating bank, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
NO_LPWR Equals 1 if the authority cannot take legal action 
against banks’ directors/officials, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank BRS Survey 
2003, 2007, 2012; 
European Commission 
reports 2004, 2010, 2011 
Negative 
INTERVENTION Sum of NO_INTERV, NO_CANCEL and 
NO_LPWR. 
Own computation Negative 
BLANKET Equals 1 if the insurance authorities granted 
unlimited coverage of bank deposits; 0 otherwise. 
EU Commission Staff 
Working reports 
Positive/Negative 
AFFECTED Equals 1 for banks located in countries which 
experienced a change in the COV_RATIO equals or 
above the mean of all changes occurred within 2010, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Own computation Negative 
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HIGH_COV07 Equals 1 if the COV_RATIO in 2007 is equal or 
above the annual mean values, 0 otherwise. 
Own computation Negative 
BANK CONTROLS    
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. BankScope Positive/Negative 
ETA Equity to total assets. BankScope Positive 
DEP_TA Total customer deposits to total assets. BankScope Positive/Negative 
CIR Cost-income ratio. BankScope Negative 
DIV Non-interest income to net operating revenue. BankScope Positive 
LLR_GL Loan loss reserves to gross loans. BankScope Negative 
COUNTRY CONTROLS   
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman index. EU Banking Structures 
reports 
Positive/Negative 
ΔGDP Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency. 
World Bank Financial 
Development Database 
Positive 
GDP_PC  Natural logarithm of yearly real GDP to the average 
population of a specific year. 
Eurostat and World Bank 
Financial Development 
Database 
Positive 
CRISIS Equals 1 for the years 2008-2013, 0 otherwise. Own computation Negative 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of the Z-score and its components by year 
 
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25 and 75 percentile) of the dependent variable (the natural logarithm of the Z-score), and of its components 
(Equity to total assets, ETA; Return on average assets, ROAA; and the standard deviation of ROAA, σROAA) by year over 2003–2013. Z-score is winsorised at the 1% of each 
tail.  
 
Year 
Z-score Components of Z-score 
ETA     ROAA σROAA 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.–75 p. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.–75 p. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.–75 p. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.–75 p. 
2003 4.449 
(1.410) 
3.592 – 5.244 0.083 
(0.088) 
0.046 – 0.081 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.005 0.262 
(0.577) 
0.028 – 0.221 
2004 4.589 
(1.450) 
3.670 – 5.468 0.083 
(0.083) 
0.048 – 0.084 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.006 0.257 
(0.595) 
0.024 – 0.199 
2005 4.586 
(1.574) 
3.507 – 5.593 0.091 
(0.081) 
0.053 – 0.102 0.006 
(0.008) 
0.002 – 0.008 0.284 
(0.599) 
0.021 – 0.258 
2006 4.580 
(1.603) 
3.411 – 5.623 0.095 
(0.089) 
0.055 – 0.103 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.002 – 0.009 0.277 
(0.574) 
0.021 – 0.282 
2007 4.435 
(1.457) 
3.478 – 5.219 0.094 
(0.085) 
0.055 – 0.103 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.001 – 0.009 0.277 
(0.528) 
0.035 – 0.294 
2008 4.230 
(1.455) 
3.323 – 4.983 0.091 
(0.085) 
0.053 – 0.100 0.003 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.006 0.321 
(0.619) 
0.046 – 0.300 
2009 4.176 
(1.484) 
3.255 – 5.064 0.093 
(0.085) 
0.055 – 0.102 0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.005 0.363 
(0.665) 
0.042 – 0.379 
2010 4.265 
(1.513) 
3.300 – 5.176 0.097 
(0.090) 
0.058 – 0.102 0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.005 0.346 
(0.649) 
0.041 – 0.346 
2011 4.577 
(1.643) 
3.523 – 5.618 0.102 
(0.100) 
0.062 – 0.104 0.002 
(0.009) 
0.001 – 0.004 0.329 
(0.687) 
0.029 – 0.274 
2012 4.679 
(1.702) 
3.580 – 5.853 0.102 
(0.088) 
0.067 – 0.107 0.002 
(0.009) 
0.001 – 0.005 0.324 
(0.689) 
0.023 – 0.276 
2013 4.791 
(1.761) 
3.674 – 6.021 0.102 
(0.080) 
0.071 – 0.108 0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 – 0.004 0.307 
(0.654) 
0.020 – 0.260 
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Table 3 – Selected deposit insurance design features distribution across European countries 
 
This table reports the distribution of the deposit insurance design features by group belonging (COVERAGE – Panel A, FUNDING & ADMIN – Panel B, and INTERVENTION – 
Panel C) in the 27 EU countries at the beginning and at the end of the period considered (2003 and 2013), and in the year of the outbreak of the financial crisis (2008). Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. All these characteristics are collected from the cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision compiled by the World Bank (2003, 
2007, and 2012) and from the European Commission reports (2004, 2010, and 2011). The symbol * denotes the presence of the blanket guarantee during the period 2008–2010. 
Number of banks by country is indicated in brackets.  
 
Panel A - COVERAGE 
 
Country 
Level of Deposit Insurance Coverage  
(in Euros) 
Level of Deposit Insurance Coverage 
to the real GDP per capita 
 
HIGH_COV 
 
NO_COINS 
2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 
Austria (289) 20,000 50,000* 100,000 0.696 1.470 2.702 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Belgium (48) 20,000 100,000 100,000 0.714 3.086 2.898 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Bulgaria (25) 7,670 51,129 100,000 2.950 11.115 18.181 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus (17) 20,000 20,000 100,000 1.156 0.917 5.263 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Czech Republic (26) 25,000 50,000 100,000 2.777 3.378 7.042 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Denmark (116) 40,229 40,229* 100,000 1.102 0.939 2.252 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Estonia (9) 6,391 50,000 100,000 0.887 4.132 7.194 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland (18) 25,000 50,000 100,000 0.859 1.432 2.808 0 1 0 1 1 1 
France (283) 70,000 70,000 100,000 2.641 2.325 3.194 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Germany (1,870) 20,000 20,000* 100,000 0.751 0.664 3.003 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Greece (20) 20,000 100,000* 100,000 1.190 4.807 6.060 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hungary (31) 11,829 49,430* 100,000 1.460 4.707 10.101 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Ireland (16) 20,000 100,000* 100,000 0.542 2.493 2.808 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Italy (674) 103,291 103,291 100,000 4.303 3.927 3.906 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Latvia (22) 4,600 50,000 100,000 0.938 4.761 8.620 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Lithuania (12) 20,000 100,000 100,000 3.703 9.900 8.547 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Luxembourg (95) 20,000 20,000 100,000 0.333 0.261 1.199 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Malta (9) 20,000 20,000 100,000 1.724 1.369 5.813 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Netherlands (38) 20,000 100,000 100,000 0.662 2.762 2.785 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Poland (48) 22,500 50,000 100,000 4.245 5.263 9.900 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Portugal (29) 25,000 100,000 100,000 1.760 6.172 6.329 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Romania (29) 3,000 50,000 100,000 1.071 7.352 14.048 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovakia (17) 20,000 100,000* 100,000 3.174 1.680 7.518 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Slovenia (18) 18,500 22,000* 100,000 1.360 1.195 5.847 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Spain (189) 20,000 100,000 100,000 1.015 4.184 4.484 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden (103) 27,533 50,000 100,000 0.849 1.385 2.283 0 0 0 1 1 1 
United Kingdom (136) 44,961 64,329 102,040 1.503 2.151 3.378 1 1 1 0 0 1 
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Panel B – FUNDING & ADMIN 
 
Country 
GOV_FUND NO_EXANTE NO_RISKADJ NO_GOVADMIN 
2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 
Austria 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Lithuania 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Poland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovenia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Panel C - INTERVENTION 
 
Country 
NO_INTERV NO_CANCEL NO_LEGALPWR 
2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 
Austria 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Belgium 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
France 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Germany 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Greece 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Hungary 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Italy 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Malta 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovakia 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Slovenia 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Sweden 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 4 – Summary statistics of the control variables in the pre-crisis and crisis periods 
 
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25 and 75 percentile) of the control variables in the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and crisis years (2008–2013). 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, and LLR_GL) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for test of differences in means between pre-crisis (I) and crisis period (II).         
         
 
Variables 
Pre-crisis period  
(I) 
Crisis period  
(II) 
Difference  
in means  
(I) – (II) Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.- 75 p. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
25 p.- 75 p. 
SIZE 6.448 
(1.563) 
5.479 – 7.309 6.664 
(1.803) 
5.436 – 7.616 -0.215*** 
ETA 0.083 
(0.075) 
0.050 – 0.088 0.094 
(0.078) 
0.060 – 0.103 -0.011*** 
DEP_TA 0.659 
(0.1919 
0.593 – 0.788 0.643 
(0.197) 
0.533 – 0.786 0.016*** 
CIR 0.674 
(0.156) 
0.601 – 0.750 0.677 
(0.169) 
0.597 – 0.750 -0.002 
DIV 0.296 
(0.159) 
0.215 – 0.345 0.291 
(0.164) 
0.214 – 0.333 0.004** 
LLR_GL 0.007 
(0.0001) 
0 – 0.002 0.017 
(0.0001) 
0 – 0.024 -0.009*** 
HHI 0.040 
(0.040) 
0.017 – 0.053 0.045 
(0.036) 
0.0298 – 0.046 -0.004*** 
ΔGDP 0.023 
(0.018) 
0.008 – 0.036 0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.011 – 0.017 0.022*** 
GDP_PC 10.190 
(0.386) 
10.188 – 10.292 10.271 
(0.323) 
10.165 – 10.392 -0.080*** 
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Table 5 – Panel estimation results with quadratic transformation of deposit coverage for different sub-samples 
 
This table reports the estimates of the baseline model in two panels. The sample period is 2003–2013. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Z-score. The variables 
of interest are: COV_RATIO, its square COV_RATIO2, and the two aggregate variables FUNDING & ADMIN, and INTERVENTION. All our target variables are interacted with 
the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and crisis years (2008–2013), respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one quarter with respect to 
the dependent variable. Bank-fixed effect are included in all specifications. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are 
reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Panel A reports the baseline model for ‘All banks’ and for the following sub-samples: commercial versus cooperative and savings banks; the smallest (bottom quartile by SIZE) 
versus the biggest banks (top quartile by SIZE); banks with the lowest reliance on customer deposits (bottom quartile by DEP_TA) versus those with the highest dependency from 
customer deposits (top quartile by DEP_TA). The figures in brackets in the headline row indicate the number of banks.  
Panel B reports the results for no-GIIPS countries (different from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) from the sample, orientation of the financial system (bottom quartile 
by the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP vs top quartile) and the supervisory power of the authority (below vs above the sample mean). 
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Panel A – Types of banks 
Variables All banks 
(4,187 obs) 
Commercial banks 
(1,215 obs) 
Cooperative & Savings 
banks 
(2,972 obs) 
Small banks Large banks 
Banks  
with the lowest 
dependency on 
customer deposits 
Banks  
with the highest 
dependency on 
customer deposits 
COV_RATIO (-1)*pre-crisis  0.226*** 0.212*** 0.689*** -0.446 0.418*** 0.279*** -0.151 
 (0.062) (0.075) (0.211) (0.278) (0.089) (0.107) (0.121) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*pre-crisis -0.053 -0.173** -0.582*** 0.318 0.012 -0.191** -0.086 
 (0.057) (0.072) (0.206) (0.255) (0.085) (0.093) (0.122) 
COV_RATIO (-1)*crisis 0.323*** 0.353*** 0.191*** 0.116 0.439*** 0.338*** 0.231*** 
 (0.032) (0.057) (0.048) (0.081) (0.062) (0.075) (0.060) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*crisis -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.087* -0.101 -0.126*** -0.163*** -0.115** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.050) (0.084) (0.044) (0.052) (0.048) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*pre-crisis -0.002 -0.050 -0.220** -0.092 0.147 -0.228 -0.115 
 (0.060) (0.080) (0.103) (0.122) (0.099) (0.139) (0.095) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*crisis -0.200*** -0.157* -0.398*** -0.360*** -0.082 -0.348** -0.290*** 
 (0.063) (0.083) (0.108) (0.129) (0.106) (0.145) (0.101) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*pre-crisis -0.181*** -0.063 -0.144*** -0.411*** -0.046 -0.038 -0.139** 
 (0.029) (0.053) (0.041) (0.077) (0.058) (0.067) (0.061) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*crisis -0.153*** 0.055 -0.220*** -0.324*** -0.069 0.149* -0.199*** 
 (0.030) (0.057) (0.036) (0.069) (0.058) (0.077) (0.060) 
SIZE (-1) 0.128** 0.178*** 0.029 0.236 0.137 0.303*** 0.282 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.105) (0.147) (0.095) (0.081) (0.176) 
ETA (-1) 2.873*** 1.995*** 5.886*** 1.783** 6.642*** 1.679*** 4.256*** 
 (0.436) (0.460) (0.997) (0.794) (1.260) (0.511) (1.520) 
DEP_TA (-1) 0.768*** 0.464** 0.988*** 0.431 1.102*** 0.240 0.860* 
 (0.182) (0.225) (0.292) (0.383) (0.309) (0.273) (0.513) 
CIR (-1) -0.595*** -0.661*** -0.335** -0.600*** -0.855*** -0.390*** -0.675*** 
 (0.083) (0.107) (0.132) (0.145) (0.152) (0.126) (0.180) 
DIV (-1) -0.038 -0.100 0.005 -0.619*** -0.211 0.161 -0.661*** 
 (0.103) (0.128) (0.168) (0.212) (0.165) (0.135) (0.238) 
LLR_GL (-1) -1.529** -3.629*** 1.230 0.482 -4.678*** -3.137** 1.302 
 (0.710) (0.970) (1.110) (1.413) (1.343) (1.278) (1.924) 
HHI (-1) 5.980*** -1.348 12.522*** 2.235 3.741** 4.760** 0.114 
 (1.168) (1.426) (2.209) (3.770) (1.553) (2.163) (1.908) 
ΔGDP (-1) 2.524*** 2.774*** 1.198*** 2.295*** 2.943*** 3.412*** 2.318*** 
 (0.265) (0.454) (0.387) (0.613) (0.503) (0.540) (0.526) 
GDP_PC (-1) 0.971*** -0.050 2.276*** 0.667 1.306*** -0.195 0.745* 
 (0.188) (0.219) (0.340) (0.420) (0.324) (0.358) (0.381) 
CRISIS -0.155 -0.552*** -0.248* -0.062 -0.135 -0.687*** 0.046 
 (0.100) (0.165) (0.132) (0.253) (0.177) (0.212) (0.220) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No No No No No 
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 27,584 6,780 20,804 6,004 7,012 6,382 6,862 
R-squared 0.062 0.073 0.072 0.054 0.117 0.058 0.050 
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Panel B – Operating environment 
Variables 
 
No-GIIPS countries 
Market-oriented financial 
systems 
Bank-oriented financial 
systems 
Weak supervisory power  Strong  supervisory power  
COV_RATIO (-1)*pre-crisis  0.271*** -0.042 0.142 0.860*** 0.120 
 (0.063) (0.303) (0.226) (0.185) (0.076) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*pre-crisis 0.096 -0.227 -0.599** -0.501*** -0.234*** 
 (0.078) (0.246) (0.238) (0.177) (0.076) 
COV_RATIO (-1)*crisis 0.297*** -0.075 0.333*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 
 (0.033) (0.167) (0.064) (0.054) (0.056) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*crisis -0.073** -0.023 -0.082* 0.184*** -0.090*** 
 (0.030) (0.073) (0.047) (0.070) (0.033) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*pre-crisis -0.037 -0.076 -0.473** 0.064 -0.053 
 (0.061) (0.105) (0.239) (0.092) (0.083) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*crisis -0.224*** -0.364*** -0.292 0.066 -0.046 
 (0.065) (0.126) (0.205) (0.092) (0.086) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*pre-crisis -0.133*** -0.156** -0.273 -0.053 -0.031 
 (0.030) (0.061) (0.184) (0.038) (0.054) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*crisis -0.173*** -0.148 0.211*** -0.168*** 0.056 
 (0.030) (0.101) (0.082) (0.033) (0.056) 
SIZE (-1) 0.077 0.264** 0.283*** -0.208** 0.314*** 
 (0.067) (0.106) (0.100) (0.102) (0.086) 
ETA (-1) 2.617*** 2.888*** 2.740*** 1.551*** 2.132*** 
 (0.464) (0.943) (0.755) (0.585) (0.618) 
DEP_TA (-1) 0.764*** 0.607* 0.163 0.678** 0.331 
 (0.212) (0.359) (0.280) (0.306) (0.231) 
CIR (-1) -0.545*** -0.692*** -0.535*** -0.438*** -0.576*** 
 (0.095) (0.149) (0.139) (0.126) (0.118) 
DIV (-1) -0.083 -0.186 -0.041 -0.221 -0.034 
 (0.120) (0.253) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
LLR_GL (-1) -1.309 -4.112*** -0.076 0.449 -3.182*** 
 (0.861) (1.124) (0.959) (1.088) (1.074) 
HHI (-1) 5.962*** -0.341 -5.147 -4.546 -1.638 
 (1.219) (1.621) (3.156) (2.810) (1.454) 
ΔGDP (-1) 1.639*** 0.391 4.189*** -0.615 1.668*** 
 (0.310) (0.624) (0.480) (0.557) (0.508) 
GDP_PC (-1) 0.985*** 0.490* 0.425 3.089*** -0.444* 
 (0.207) (0.292) (0.363) (0.322) (0.262) 
CRISIS -0.002 -0.218 -2.117*** -0.306** -0.783*** 
 (0.104) (0.303) (0.597) (0.124) (0.230) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 22,561 5,763 5,621 20,138 7,446 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.089 0.076 0.079 
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Table 6 – The relationship between deposit insurance features and stability 
 
This table reports estimates of bank fixed-effect (FE) regressions for the full sample over the period 2003–2013. Model 
(I) shows estimates for our variables of interest considered at aggregate level (COVERAGE, FUNDING & ADMIN, and, 
INTERVENTION), plus the control variables. Models (II), (III), and (IV) show estimates obtained by splitting COV_SUM, 
FUNDING & ADMIN, and, INTERVENTION into their components, plus the control variables. All our variables of 
interest are interacted with the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and crisis years (2008–2013), respectively. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of the Z-score. The control variables include: SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, LLR_GL, HHI, 
ΔGDP, and GDP_PC. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year with 
respect to the dependent variable. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Bank clustered standard 
errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The columns “Test” report the level of significance of the difference of each DIS 
feature’s coefficients in the two periods under investigation. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variables (I) Test (II) Test (III) Test (IV) Test 
COVERAGE (-1)*pre-crisi 0.152***    0.177***  0.037   (0.031)    (0.035)  (0.031)  
COVERAGE (-1)*crisis 0.101*** **   0.073*** *** 0.083***   (0.025)    (0.024)  (0.025)  
HIGH_COV (-1)*pre-crisis   -0.075         (0.056)      
HIGH_COV (-1)*crisis   -0.277*** ***        (0.036)      
NO_COINS (-1)*pre-crisis   0.183***         (0.046)      
NO_COINS (-1)*crisis   0.306*** ***        (0.032)      
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*pre-crisis -0.018  -0.028    -0.060   (0.061)  (0.059)    (0.061)  
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*crisis -0.187*** *** -0.172*** ***   -0.212*** *** 
 (0.064)  (0.063)    (0.064)  
GOV_FUND (-1)*pre-crisis     0.970***         (0.129)    
GOV_FUND (-1)*crisis     -0.332 ***        (0.212)    
NO_EXANTE (-1)*pre-crisis     -0.339***         (0.130)    
NO_EXANTE (-1)*crisis     -0.145 ***        (0.133)    
NO_RISKADJ (-1)*pre-crisis     -0.031         (0.094)    
NO_RISKADJ (-1)*crisis     -0.563*** ***        (0.091)    
GOV_ADMIN (-1)*pre-crisis     0.061         (0.124)    
GOV_ADMIN (-1)*crisis     0.113         (0.129)    
INTERVENTION (-1)*pre-crisis -0.210***  -0.206***  -0.152***     (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)    
INTERVENTION (-1)*crisis -0.248***  -0.173***  -0.260*** ***    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)    
NO_INTERV (-1)*pre-crisis       -0.192*         (0.107)  
NO_INTERV (-1)*crisis       -0.245**         (0.117)  
NO_CANCEL (-1)*pre-crisis       -0.264***         (0.045)  
NO_CANCEL (-1)*crisis       -0.374*** ** 
       (0.032)  
NO_LEGALPWR (-1)*pre-crisis       -0.116***         (0.034)  
NO_LEGALPWR (-1)*crisis       0.081 *** 
       (0.061)  
Control_var (-1) Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes           
CRISIS 0.023  -0.236**  0.109  -0.218   (0.098)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.150)  
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cluster SE Bank Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N. of obs. 27,584  27,584  27,584  27,584  
R-squared 0.055  0.062  0.062  0.058  
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Table 7 – Panel estimation results with blanket guarantee 
 
This table reports estimates of bank fixed-effect (FE) regressions over the period 2008–2010. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the Z-score. The variables of interest are: BLANKET, FUNDING & ADMIN, and 
INTERVENTION. The control variables include: SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, LLR_GL, HHI, ΔGDP, and GDP_PC. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent 
variable. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported 
in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variables Z-score 
BLANKET (-1) 0.205*** 
 (0.046) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1) 0.023 
 (0.059) 
INTERVENTION (-1) -0.107** 
 (0.043) 
Control_var (-1) Yes 
Bank FE Yes 
Cluster SE Bank Yes 
N. of obs. 9,356 
R-squared 0.023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Table 8 – Estimates with the magnitude of regulatory changes in deposit coverage throughout 2008-
2013 
 
This table reports estimates of OLS regressions during the period 2008–2013. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score. The variables of interest in model are: AFFECTED, HIGH_COV07, their interaction term 
(AFFECTED*HIGH_COV07), NO_COINS, FUNDING & ADMIN, and INTERVENTION. The variable AFFECTED is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 for those banks located in countries which experienced a change in coverage equals 
or above the mean of all changes occurred within 2010, and 0 otherwise. The variable HIGH_COV07 is a dummy that 
takes the values of the already defined HIGH_COV07. These two variables and their interaction are not lagged. The 
control variables include: SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, LLR_GL, HHI, ΔGDP, and GDP_PC. Definitions of the 
remaining variables are provided in Table 1. NO_COINS, FUNDING & ADMIN, INTERVENTION and the control 
variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 
1% of each tail. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 
coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variables Z-score 
AFFECTED 0.814*** 
 (0.179) 
HIGH_COV07 3.531*** 
 (0.674) 
AFFECTED*HIGH_COV07 -2.149*** 
 (0.444) 
NO_COINS (-1) -0.083** 
 (0.042) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1) 0.632*** 
 (0.055) 
INTERVENTION (-1) -0.209*** 
 (0.037) 
Control_var (-1) Yes 
Country FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Cluster SE Bank Yes 
N. of obs. 18,429 
R-squared 0.385 
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Table 9 – Sources of bank stability: Z-score proxies 
 
This table reports estimates of bank fixed-effect (FE) regressions for the full sample over the period 2003–2013 using  the components of the Z-score (equity to total assets – ETA; 
return on average assets – ROAA; and three-year standard deviation of ROAA - σROAA), the quality of the loan portfolio and the Tier 1 capital ratio as dependent variables. The 
variables of interests are: COVERAGE, FUNDING & ADMIN, and INTERVENTION. All our target variables are interacted with the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and crisis years (2008–
2013), respectively. The control variables include: SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, LLR_GL, HHI, ΔGDP, and GPDPC. When we use ETA and LLR_GL as dependent variable, 
we obviously exclude them from the control variables. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent 
variable. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Bank clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variables ETA ROAA σROAA LLR_GL TIER1 RATIO 
COV_RATIO (-1)*pre-crisis  0.013*** 0.003*** -0.021 -0.004*** 1.964** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.855) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*pre-crisis -0.002 -0.002*** 0.026 0.006*** 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.027) (0.001) (0.696) 
COV_RATIO (-1)*crisis 0.008*** 0.001*** -0.067*** -0.001** 1.398*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.016) (0.001) (0.226) 
COV_RATIO2 (-1)*crisis 0.002* -0.001*** 0.082*** 0.008*** 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.001) (0.163) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*pre-crisis 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 1.361** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.038) (0.001) (0.666) 
FUNDING & ADMIN (-1)*crisis 0.000 -0.001*** 0.085** 0.001 1.271* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.663) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*pre-crisis 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.071*** 0.001*** -0.356 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.428) 
INTERVENTION (-1)*crisis -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.013 0.001** 0.039 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001) (0.295) 
Control_var (-1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRISIS 0.022*** -0.001 0.155*** -0.001 0.051 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.048) (0.002) (1.244) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 27,584 27,584 27,584 27,556 10,413 
R-squared 0.111 0.163 0.074 0.183 0.095 
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Table 10 – Exogeneity of deposit insurance coverage increase and blanket guarantees 
 
 
The table reports a Cox (1972) proportional hazard (Cox PH) model to verify that the increase of deposit insurance 
coverage above average over the period 2008–2010, proxied by the treatment variable AFFECTED, and the introduction 
of a blanket guarantee (BLANKET) are exogenous with respect to bank stability, measured by the natural logarithm of 
the Z-score. The independent variable denotes the hazard of observing above average deposit insurance coverage increase 
and blanket guarantees. Our sample period is 2003–2010. A country is released from the analysis once it experiences the 
intervention of interest. The control variables include: SIZE, ETA, DEP_TA, CIR, DIV, LLR_GL, HHI, ΔGDP, and 
GDP_PC. Definitions of the remaining variables are provided in Table 1. Standard errors are robust. Robust t-statistics 
are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables AFFECTED BLANKET 
Z-score 0.718 
(0.109) 
0.805 
(0.296) 
Control_var  Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 188 188 
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Figure 1 – The relationship between bank stability and deposit coverage 
  
 
The figure gives qualitative evidence of the non-linear relation between banks’ stability (measured by the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score) and the coverage ratio - COV_RATIO (measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of deposit 
insurance on the real GDP per capita), before and during the crisis.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – Correlation Matrix 
 
This table shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis over the period 2003–2013. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The symbol * 
indicates statistically significance at the 5% level. 
Variables Z-score COVERAGE FUNDING & ADMIN INTERVENTION SIZE ETA DEP_TA CIR DIV LLR_GL HHI ΔGDP GDP_PC 
Z-score 1             
COVERAGE -0.2907* 1            
FUNDING & ADMIN -0.3061* 0.3273* 1           
INTERVENTION -0.0934* -0.0399* 0.0502* 1          
SIZE -0.0674* 0.1174* 0.1495* -0.1598* 1         
ETA -0.0904* 0.2087* 0.1596* 0.0427* -0.2960* 1        
DEP_TA 0.2091* -0.3246* -0.1657* -0.0297* -0.3112* -0.2887* 1       
CIR -0.0715* -0.0647* -0.1146* 0.0431* -0.2238* 0.0072 0.1298* 1      
DIV -0.1824* 0.0553* 0.0712* -0.0383* 0.1259* 0.1467* -0.1610* 0.1046* 1     
LLR_GL -0.2827* 0.4326* 0.1902* 0.0742* 0.1508* 0.1104* -0.1948* -0.0005 0.0553* 1    
HHI -0.3340* 0.2920* 0.3588* -0.0092* 0.1603* 0.1347* -0.1341* -0.0460* 0.0960* 0.2562* 1   
ΔGDP 0.0591* -0.2035* 0.0917* 0.0310* -0.0169* -0.0034 0.0698* -0.0452* 0.0641* -0.1354* 0.0683* 1  
GDP_PC 0.1460* -0.2328* -0.1410* -0.1538* -0.0207* -0.0624* 0.0890* -0.0384* 0.0026 -0.2539* -0.2159* -0.1105* 1 
 
